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An examination of Louisiana's law of defamation must
include the historical development of the English common law
torts of libel and slander, for against this background is afforded
the best comparison of the Louisiana position with the attitude
prevailing in the remainder of the United States. The signi-
ficance of particular Louisiana problems and the general impact
on defamation of recent United States Supreme Court decisions
can then be understood.
Defamation is an invasion of the plaintiff's interest in repu-
tation and good name. Professor Prosser defines defamation as:
"[T]hat which tends to injure 'reputation' in the popular
sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence
in which plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory
or unpleasant feelings against him."'
THE COMMON LAW
Before modern-day telecommunications and travel, defama-
tion was necessarily localized in its effect. During the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries defamed persons found redress in the
seignorial courts,2 where their reputations could be cleared in
the presence of those who heard them attacked.
Even before the complete demise of manorial courts in the
Middle Ages, the ecclesiastical courts exercised general juris-
diction over the sin of defamation, imposing a penance which
also cleared the victim's reputation.8 The decay of the local
courts enabled the Church to acquire the exclusive right to
1. PROSSER, TORTS § 106 (3d ed. 1964). See also SALMOND, TORTS 398 (8th
ed. 1934); BOWER, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 4 (2d ed. 1923); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 559 (1938). BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1957), defines defamatory
[words] as those which "produce any perceptible injury to the reputation of
another."
A colorful characterization of reputation is found in Dale System,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527, 530 (D. Conn. 1953): "[A] plaintiff's
repute is his character and personality in the eyes of others. It thus com-
prises myriad relationships in all of which the plaintiff's individuality is
the focus."
2. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defama-
tion, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 549 (1903).
3. Id. at 549-51. The primary purpose of the Church's treatment was
for correction of the slanderer for his soul's health; but an apology to the
person defamed was a part of the ritual.
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deal with defamation, but this situation did not last in an era
of rising common law courts.
Van Vechten Veeder suggests that the manner in which
the royal courts usurped jurisdiction in defamation was through
a fiction 4 - a distinction between defamation causing only
spiritual harm and defamation causing temporal damage.5 Tem-
poral, or special, defamation is the actual loss of some material
advantage which is pecuniary or capable of estimation in money.6
Of certain classes of defamation-imputations of crime;7
imputations of loathsome disease;8 imputations affecting the
business, trade, profession or calling of the person defamed;9
and, later by statute, imputations of unchastity of a woman'10-
it was said that temporal damage resulted from the very fact
of communication of information of that nature, and proof
of the defamation itself was considered to establish the tem-
poral loss which the jury was permitted to estimate without
other evidence." Beyond these categories where temporal dam-
4. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of De-
famation, 3 CoLUM. L. REV. 546, 560 n.1 (1903).
5. PROSSER, TORTS § 106 (3d ed. 1964). Things relating to money or busi-
ness were temporal. See also Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory
of the Law o Dafamation, 3 COLUM. L, REv. 546, 561 n.1 (1903); Holdsworth,
Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q. REV. 302,
397, 398-401 (1924). The distinction amounted to the line of division between
cases that could be brought in the king's courts and those that would
remain in the ecclesiastical courts. See MCCORMIcK, DAMAGES § 113 n.5 (1935).
6. GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 72 (5th ed. 1960), citing the following cases
to establish this definition: "actual temporal loss"-Ratcliffe v. Evans, 2 Q.B.
532 (1892); "temporal advantage"-Chamberlain v. Boyd, 11 Q.B.D. 412, 415
(1883); "capable of being estimated in money"-Roberts v. Roberts, 5 B. & S.
389 (1864); Chamberlain v. Boyd, 11 Q.B.D. 412 (1883); Hayward v. Pulliger
[1950], 1 All E.R. 581. Accord. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 575, comment b (1938),
which states that special harm is harm of a material and generally of a
pecuniary nature.
7. Heming v. Power, 10 M. & W. 564, 152 Eng. Rep. 595 (1842); 1 STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 279 (1906) (injury caused by plaintiff being
placed in danger of criminal prosecution).
8. Carslake v. Mapledorams, 2 T.R. 473, 100 Eng. Rep. 255 (1788);
Taylor v. Hall, 2 Stra. 1189, 93 Eng. Rep. 1118 (1743) (imputation of loath-
some disease resulted in exclusion from society).
9. See Lawson, The Slander of a Person in His Calling, 15 AM. L. REV.
573 (1881) (fear that if a man's means of livelihood were Impaired he
would become a ward of the state).
10. SLANDER OF WOMEN AcT, 54 & 55 Vict., C. 51 (1891) (originally con-
sidered only a sin or a purely spiritual matter, this Act created the legal
presumption of injury).
11. Carpenter, Libel Per Se in California and Some Other States, 17
So. CALIF. L. REV. 347, 348-49 (1944). "These classes are where the slanderous
words impute (a) a crime of magnitude, variously defined, (b) the present
possession of a loathsome disease, or (c) conduct or characteristics that
would tend to injure or prejudice plaintiff's reputation in relation to his
office, profession or trade."
It seems that the justification for the theory of temporal damage as a
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age was presumed, the courts retained an open-ended possibility
for jurisdiction in cases where any other temporal damages
could be shown.
Prior to the invention of printing, defamation was almost
without exception oral, and was usually referred to at common
law as slander. Printing and increasing literacy in the seven-
teenth century necessitated the working out of a separate body of
doctrine for written defamation-libel-by the Star Chamber.12
With oral defamation being subdivided on the point of special
damage as to the possibility of remedy in the king's courts,
the same considerations had to be viewed for printed defama-
tion. Under the theory that the written or printed word was
more onerous, deliberately malignant, lasting, widespread and
temporal in effect, stricter rules of liability were ordained. To
avoid resort to self-help and consequent breaches of the peace,18
no showing of special damage was required as a condition for
a libel action,14 and in the 1812 decision of Thorley v. Lord
Kerry,15 the English common law was expressly settled that in
an action for libel (as opposed to slander) damages could be
recovered without pleading or proving that any special damage
attached.
DEFAMATION TODAY
Today most American courts require no showing of special
damages in cases of libel,1 and subdivide slander into two
categories-one including the original classes of slander in which
whole and the above classes specifically is that a person who is so damaged
Is in danger of becoming a ward of the state because he can no longer
earn a living. Thus to protect itself from this burden, the state must provide
a redress to the aggrieved through its courts. See NWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL
1 20 (4th ed. 1924); PLuCKNaTT, A CONCIsE HMsToRY OF THE COMMON LAw
427-45 (5th ed. 1956).
12. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 113 n.5 (1935); Bower, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION
282 (2d ed. 1923).
13. Such stricter rules were first reported in De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co.
Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (1605), emphasizing that libels deserved punish-
ment as inciting to revenge and leading to quarrels and general breaches
of the peace. See also BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 502 (1965).
14. PROSSER, TORTS § 107 (8d ed. 1964).
15. 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812).
16. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569 (1938): "One who falsely, and without
a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to another in such a
manner as to make the publication a libel is liable to the other although
no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom."
This is the position reached in 1909 by the Supreme Court of the United
States, rejecting the necessity of pecuniary damage in the law of libel.
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
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damages were presumed,17 the other being those slanderous
statements in which pecuniary damage must be proved.'
The position of the current Restatement on the question of
libel is the subject of much controversy. Professor Prosser is
urging a change in the Restatement Second, claiming that the
majority position has shifted. He points to a trend in some
American jurisdictions to require proof of special damage in
certain alleged libelous situations, labeled "libel per quod."
Prosser considers this an indication that our courts are inching
toward fusion of the common law torts of libel and slander.19
This suggestion has spawned an excellent and well-docu-
mented protest to Prosser's conclusions in the Harvard Law
Review,2 0 where the writer discusses some of the general prob-
lems that perplex the courts in this area, and then argues that
section 569 of the Restatement, which declares all libel claims
actionable without proof of special damage, represents the pre-
vailing view of United States courts, which should not be altered.
In an equally well-supported answer by Prosser in the same
issue,2 1 he adheres to the notion that the trend of American
cases is to treat libel like slander-a plaintiff being unable to
recover for libel without proof of special damages in any
case where he would not recover if the utterance were slander.
Defamation which does not require allegation or proof of
special damages is referred to as "actionable per se," while
that for which the allegation and proof is necessary is called
"actionable per quod."' 2
17. See text at n.7 supra. This is exemplified in RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 570 (1938): "One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes
matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication
a slander is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of reputa-
tion results if the publication imputes to the other (a) a criminal offense
... or (b) a presently existing venereal or other loathsome and commun-
icable disease . . . or (c) conduct, characteristics, or a condition incom-
patible with the proper exercise of his lawful business, trade, profession,
or office . .. or (d) the other being a woman, acts of unchastity. .... "
18. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 575 (1938): "One who falsely and without
a privilege to do so publishes a slander which, although not actionable
per se, is the legal cause of special harm to the person defamed, is liable
to him."
19. See Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rev. 839 (1960).
20. Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv.
733 (1966).
21. Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. Rev. 1629 (1966).
22. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569 comment b (1938).
23. See Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HRv. L. Rev.
733, 736 (1966): "At common law, an action on the case was an action to
recover the actual damages caused by the defendant's conduct. The Latin
expression 'per quod,' meaning 'whereby,' traditionally introduced the
19671
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The "actionable per se" terminology leads to confusion when
a distinction is also made between words which convey a
defamatory meaning on their face, and words which may appear
innocent on their face, but when considered in light of all other
surrounding facts and circumstances are clearly offensive. The
former are often labeled "defamatory per se" or "slanderous
per se." The latter must have an accompanying innuendo or
explanation to be properly pleaded,24 and if labeled at all should
be referred to as "slanderous per quod." However, this require-
ment is unrelated to whether certain slander is actionable with-
out a showing of special damages.2 5 It is understandable how
the use of the phrase per se in both connections has engendered
confusion and distortion.26
In common law pleading, the extrinsic facts referred to,
set forth in the "inducement" and the "innuendo" segment of
the pleadings, explained the defamatory meaning of the com-
munication in light of the extrinsic facts. 27 The innuendo also
served to demonstrate that a defamatory meaning was the one
conveyed and understood when the words used were capable
of either a defamatory or a non-defamatory construction, and
to indicate the application to the plaintiff if the connection was
not prima facie clear.2 -
The determination of whether statements were slander
per se (clear in their meaning) or whether extrinsic facts had
to be examined should precede or coincide with a characteri-
zation of the words as actionable per se at common law or only
actionable with a showing of special damages. A statement
specification of damages incurred-a necessary element for an action on
the case. Actions that required this 'per quod' allegation of damages came
to be known as 'actionable per quod.' Actions that did not require it, for
example, trespass quare clau8um fregit, were called 'actionable per se.'"
24. See GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 451-52 (5th ed. 1960); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 57 (McKinney ed. 1898).
25. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 575 (1938), is careful to use the terminology
"actionable per se"-not "slander per se." "One who falsely and without
a privilege to do so publishes a slander which, although not actionable
per se, is the legal cause of special harm to the person defamed, is liable
to him."
26. Good illustrations of the distinction may be found in Woolston v.
Montana Free Press, 90 Mont. 299, 2 P.2d 1020 (1931), and Bowie v. Evening
News, 148 Md. 569, 129 A. 797 (1925). See generally MCCORMICK, DAMAGES
§ 113 (1935).
27. Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv.
733, 736 (1966).
28. A detailed analysis of this phase of common law pleading may be
found in GATLEY, LIBEL AND SLANDER 451-52 (5th ed. 1960). See also ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE 57 (McKinney ed. 1898).
[Vol. XXVHIi
1967] COMMENTS
might appear innocent on its face; but, when additional facts
were revealed, not only would the statement be slanderous, but
if the innuendo made the whole circumstances fit into one of the
designated categories (crimes, loathsome disease, conduct incom-
patible with trade or business, unchastity of women) it would
be actionable per se. 29
If implicit or covert defamation is not in the actionable
per se classes, special damages would have to be shown, as in
the case of a statement defamatory on its face.80
Whether the defamatory character appears on the face Of
the statement or is covert and requires extrinsic explanation,
29. Suppose A, knowing his statement to be false, deliberately states
that Mrs. B, a prominent socialite, gave birth to twins. This is apparently
innocent on its face, but when the innuendo explained the communication
In the light of the extrinsic fact that Mrs. B has only been married three
months, the defamatory character is shown in the suggestion of improper
conduct or pre-marital involvement of Mrs. B. Though the statement was
not slander per se, the extrinsic explanation shows that it was "covert"
defamation, that is, the defamatory nature did not appear on the face of
the words, but was revealed only to those who knew certain circumstances
Then to apply the category test, we see that the statements imputed
unchastity to a woman, a category that is actionable per se. Thus, correct
separation of the two uses of the per se terminology demonstrates how
words innocent on their face (1) become slanderous upon reflection on
the whole of the facts and (2) would then be placed in the common law
category of words actionable per se. See Carpenter, Zbel Per Se 4% 0aW6
fornia and Some Other States, 17 So. CALIF. L. R v. 347, 353-54, 370 (1944).
See also Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918), where Mr. Justice Holmes
speaking for the Court said: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used." The same idea was conveyed by Judge Learned Hand in NLRB v.
Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941): "Words are not pebbles
in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only
does the meaning of each Interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate
take their purport from the setting in which they are used of which the
relation between the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important
part."
30. If A, knowing his statement to be false, deliberately states that B
is a playboy bachelor, this again seems innocent enough, but when it is
shown that some of those who heard the remark know that B is in fact
living with a woman who purports to be his wife, and has three children,
the picture changes. These persons draw the defamatory conclusion that
B is not married and is guilty of immoral conduct. Again, through extrinsic,
facts, slander is shown. But B cannot then place the situation in any of
the special common law classes that would be actionable per se, and must
therefore plead and prove special damages for his action to succeed.
Of course if concubinage is a crime in the given jurisdiction, B could place
the uncovered defamation under the heading of-imputation of crime and
thus put it Into the common law category of words actionable per se. This
type of reasoning has been effectively applied in cases where the defendant
has called plaintiff a "communist"; the charge being held synonymous with
the imputation of the crime of violating the Smith Act. On this latter point
see Lightfoot v. Jennings, 363 Mo. 878 (1953). See generally Note, 33 So.
CALIF. L. Rzv. 104 (1959).
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the question of special damages still must be considered unless
the statement with explanation falls into one of the special
classes.31
THE LOUISIANA DEFAmATION ACTION
Unlike most common law jurisdictions Louisiana, because
of its civilian heritage, makes no libel-slander distinction based
on the oral or written form of defamation; all defamation is
treated alike.32 Perhaps it was the recognition that the common
law of defamation, with its technical and barren distinctions,
contained some questionable doctrines foreign both to notions
of justice" and to the civilian tradition, that led the Louisiana
courts to take a somewhat different stand on the tort of defa-
mation.
From the outset Louisiana refused to be hampered in this
area by mere technicalities obstructing just results. In the
landmark decision of Miller v. Holstein3 4 plaintiff sought recov-
ery for the defendant's having accused him of swearing falsely.
The defendant contended that the mere accusation of swearing
falsely was not actionable because it did not amount to an
accusation of perjury--following the common law rule that to
recover without establishing damages, the charge complained
of must be a crime and not merely an unsavory deed. To refute
this, Justice Bullard, speaking for the court, said:
* "I am by no means prepared to adopt from the common
31. Certain text writers even suggest that should the meaning of
covert slander as extrinsically explained come under one of the headings
actionable per se, the words themselves are not actionable per se. See
GREEN, MALONE, PEDRICK & RAHL, INJURIES TO RELATIONS 397 (1st ed. 1959).
It is submitted that while this is technically correct, it tends to blur the
distinctions and amounts to an unrewarding complication.
32. Fellman v. Dreyfous, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17 So. 422 (1895); Spotorno v.
Fourichon, 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389
(1840). See also Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839, 848 (1960).
Likewise, all defamation, oral or written, receives the same treatment
in Scotland (Norman, The Law of Defamation in Scotland, 6 CAMB. L. J.
327 (1938)), and presumably Washington (see dictum in Grein v. LaPoma,
54 Wash.2d 844 (1959)). This view has also been adopted by statute in New
South Wales, N.S.W. DEFAMATION ACT § 4 (1912), and retained in the new
DEFAMATION ACT OF 1958i No. 39 N.S.W.; Queensland, DEFAMATION LAW OF 1889,
53 Vict. No. 12 § 6 (Queensland); Western Australia, WESTERN AUSTRALIAN
CRIMINAL CODE AT §§ 348-49 (1913); New Zealand, DEFAMATION ACT OF 1954,
N.Z. Stat. No. 46 § 4; and through the Canadian Uniform Defamation Act in
Manitoba, MAN. R.S.M. c. 11, §§ 2-3 (1946), and Alberta, ALTA. REV. STAT.
c. 14, §§ 2-3 (1947).
33. The law of defamation "contains anomalies and absurdities for which
no legal writer ever has had a kind word. .. " PROSSER, TORTS § 106 (3d ed.
1964).
34. 16 La. 389 (1840).
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law the distinction between words which are actionable in
themselves and words which are not; and to say that a
plaintiff is not entitled to recover in an action for slander,
unless charged with an indictable offense without proof of
special damages.""
Relying on the authority of the Civil Code 6 that every act
which caused damage to another must be repaired by the person
perpetrating the act, the court said: "If injurious words are
uttered, they fall within the terms of this provision."87 Louisiana
courts have since then rejected any distinction both between
written and oral defamation, and between defamation carrying
with it a conclusive presumption of pecuniary damage and
defamation requiring proof of special damages before recovery
will be allowed.3 8 What is at common law two separate torts
has received in Louisiana treatment as a single quasi offense8 -
defamation.4 Thus all defamation, written or oral, is actionable
without proof of pecuniary damages, because the interest pro-
tected is a person's reputation4 1 and his reputation is his
property.42 Therefore, "in Louisiana, when the defendant has
defamed the social, business, or moral interests or character
of another, he is liable to the injured party without further
proof of damage."43 This rule has been specifically expressed
by the courts whether the defamation was written4 4 or oral.45
35. Id. at 404. On this point see generally Tullis, Louisiana Legal Systems
Reappraised, 12 TUL. L. REV. 113 (1937), and Stone, Tort Doctrine in Lou-
isiana: From What Sources Does it Derive?, 16 TUL. L. Rmv. 489, 496 (1942).
36. LA. Crm CODE art. 2315 (1870).
37. 16 La. 389, 394 (1840).
38. Fellman v. Dreyfous, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17 So. 422 (1895); Spotorno v.
Fourichon, 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888). See also Prosser, Libel Per
Quod, 46 VA. L. Rsv. 839, 848 (1960).
39. Wisemore v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 190 La. 1011, 183 So. 247 (1938);
Vicknair v. Daily States Pub. Co., 153 La. 677, 96 So. 529 (1923).
40. Since defamation is a quasi offense, the prescriptive period for such
action would be one year. Interestingly, in article 3536 of the Civil Code,
a one-year prescriptive period is expressly established for "injurious words,
whether verbal or written." This supplies some grounds for the argument
that the legislative intent was always to treat oral and written words alike.
See also Central Improvement & Contracting Co. v. Grassen Contracting
Co., 119 La. 263, 44 So. 10 (1907).
41. See text at note 1 supra. See also Simms v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1940).
42. Kennedy v. Item Co., 213 La. 347, 372, 34 So.2d 886, 895 (1948).
43. Fellman v. Dreyfous, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17 So. 422 (1895); Spotorno v.
Fourichon, 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389
(1840). See also Comment, 6 LA. L. REv. 281 (1945).
44. Vicknair v. Daily States Pub. Co., 153 La. 677, 681, 96 So. 529, 530
(1923).
45. Covington v. Roberson, 111 La. 326, 42, 35 So. 586, 593 (1903).
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In Louisiana, the elements necessary to make defamatory
words46 actionable are: (1) publication, that is, communication
to some person other than the one defamed; 47 (2) falsity; (3)
malice, actual or implied;4" and (4) resulting injury.4 9
The last stated element, resultant injury to plaintiff's repu-
tation, is the very essence of the tort ° Words are only defama-
tory when they "produce . .. perceptible injury to the reputa-
tion of another." 51 The three elements discussed in the following
paragraphs all depend on the words first being found defamatory.
Since the interest protected is one's reputation, it is essential
to liability that the defamation be communicated to one other
than the person defamed. 52 This transmission of the defamatory
information is called publication, but this does not mean that it
must be printed or written.5 Since it is the defamatory meaning
46. It is sufficient that plaintiff prove the substance of the words charged;
he need not prove every exact word. See Trimble v. Moore, 2 La. 577 (1831);
Freeland v. Lanfear, 2 Mart.(N.S.) 257 (La. 1824).
47. The mere fact that defendant only repeated another's charges
(orally or in print) and did not himself originate the scandal is no defense.
See Sanders v. Times-Picayune Pub. Co., 168 La. 1125, 123 So. 804 (1929);
Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La. Ann. 908, 19 So. 925 (1896).
"Every repetition of a slander originated by a third person is a willful
publication of it, rendering the person so repeating it liable to an action."
NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL 350 (4th ed. 1924).
The often-stated Louisiana position as to this Is, "Talebearers are as
bad as talemakers." Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La. Ann. 908, 915, 19 So. 925,
928 (1896).
The general rule also Is that the original author of a libelous publica-
tion will not be held liable for the republication or repetition by others;
however, an exception to this rule exists where the later publication is a
natural and probable consequence of the originator's initial deed. Cormier v.
Blake, 198 So.2d 139 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Giordano v. Tullier, 139 So.2d
15 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
48. See the "New York Times Rule" discussed iIra at nn. 154-175
which resulted in the elimination of presumed malice in defamation cases
involving public officials. The burden of proving actual malice is expressly
placed on plaintiff.
This writer feels that this expanding concept will find its way into all
defamation cases and not be limited to the public official situations.
49. See Derivas v. Gaspard, 1 La. App. 420, 423 (2d Cir. 1925).
50. The foundation of an action for defamation is the injury done to
the reputation. See Simms v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
51. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1957). See text at n. 1 supra.
52. Communication of non-privileged defamatory statement to only one
person constitutes actionable publication. Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So.2d 723,
726 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). See also Vicknair v. Daily States Pub. Co., 153
La. 677, 96 So. 529 (1923); Jozsa v. Moroney, 125 La. 813, 51 So. 908 (1910);
Simms v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940). But see Buggs v. Har-
rison, 152 La. 724, 94 So. 369 (1922), where size of audience being only
one person acted in mitigation of damages (defendant communicated only
to plaintiff's employer). Accord Fitzpatrick v. Zedaird Realty Co., 10 La.
App. 306, 121 So. 680 (Orl. Cir. 1929) (publication limited to grandchild and
wife whose hearing was impaired).
53. See PROSSER, TORTS § 108 (3d ed. 1964).
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of the words that must be communicated, it must be shown that
the language was understood in that sense.54 Only when it is
shown that a harmful meaning was conveyed is there redress-
able injury.55
To support an action for defamation, the charges made by
the defendant must be false.56 Truth is an absolute defense,
even though the words that cause injury to the plaintiff5 are
defamatory."8 The plaintiff need only show that the language
was defamatory, however; the defendant must then rebut a
presumption of falsity.59 Thus, the mere establishment of the
words themselves as defamatory or as conveying a defamatory
meaning is not always sufficient for the plaintiff to recover.6°
Closely related to the requirement of falsity is the element
of malice.61 "Malice expressed or implied is of essence of
slander."8' 2 Actual malice-personal ill will-may be found from
the circumstances; or, similar to the presumption of falsity, if
the words are of a defamatory nature with resulting injury, the
law presumes malice.6 3 This doctrine of implied malice is closely
54. See Simons v. Lewis, 51 La. Ann. 327, 330, 25 So. 406, 407 (1898);
Trimble v. Moore, 2 La. 577, 579 (1831).
55. See Tate v. Nicholson Pub. Co., 122 La. 472, 47 So. 774 (1908).
56. Derivas v. Gaspard, 1 La. App. 420, 423 (2d Cir. 1925). See also
Cotonio v. Guglielmo, 176 La. 421, 146 So. 11 (1933); Goldsmith v. Unity
Industrial Life Ins. & Sick Ben. Ass'n, 13 La. App. 448, 128 So. 182 (Orl.
Cir. 1930). Defamatory words need the additional element of falsity, at
least, to be actionable. Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La. Ann. 908, 914, 19 So. 925,
927 (1896). Accord, Wiel v. Israel, 42 La. Ann. 955, 8 So. 826 (1890).
57. Under Louisiana law, truth is a defense to a suit for injury to
public and private character; therefore, the words may be defamatory, yet
not be actionable because of the element of truth. Jenkins v. D X Sunray
Oil Co., 297 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1962); Deahotel v. Thtstlethwaite, 240 La. 12,
121 So.2d 222 (1960).
58. Pool v. Gaudln, 209 La. 218, 220, 24 So.2d 383, 383 (1946). Accord
Otero v. Ewing, 165 La. 398, 115 So. 633 (1928); Rayne v. Taylor, 14 La.
Ann. 406 (1859).
59. Bellis v. Times-Picayune, 226 F. Supp. 552, 554 (E.D. La. 1964), aff'd
per curiam, 341 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1965). Accord, Martin v. Markley, 202 La.
291, 11 So.2d 593 (1942).
60. Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La. Ann. 908, 914, 19 So. 925, 927 (1896),
announces that, "[Wiords which . . . are defamatory . . . if false, are
actionable." Accord, Wiel v. Israel, 42 La. Ann. 955, 8 So. 826 (1890). See
also notes 55 and 58 supra and accompanying text.
61. See Harry v. Constantin, 14 La. Ann. 782 (1859); Church of St.
Louis v. Blanc, 8 Rob. 51 (La. 1844).
62. Bocca v. Soulant, 6 La. App. 708, 711 (Orl. Cir. 1927). See also
Gilbert v. Palmer, 8 La. Ann. 130 (1853), which states: "[Words] uttered
without malice, and under circumstances from which no malice is in law
implied ... carry with them no pecuniary responsibility to the plaintiff."
63. See Kernan v. Chamberlin, 5 Rob. 116 (La. 1843); Cauchoix v.
Dupuy, 3 La. 206 (1831). Legal malice is also Inferred from the falsity of
the accusation. Ford v. Jeane, 159 La. 1041, 1044, 106 So. 558, 559 (1925).
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associated with willful and wanton conduct. As stated in
Barnhill v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co.64
"The malice imputed ... is not personal ill will, but merely
legal malice implied from willfully and wantonly doing an
unlawful act which results in injury. '65
Implied malice therefore is a second presumption which the
defendant has the burden of rebutting.66
The presumption of malice where slanderous words are
used 1 should be applied only to words defamatory on their
face rather than to those where the defamatory effect is only
extrinsic.0 8 The words must be otherwise actionable for the
presumption of malice to attach.69 As stated in Williams v.
McManus,70 the law "implies malice" to the words used "where
these are slanderous per se."7' Or as in Wimbish v. Hamilton,2
"motive may be inferred from the nature of the charge made,"78
meaning that the charges must be clearly defamatory as opposed
to only extrinsically defamatory.7 4
The benefit of the above presumptions offers the plaintiff
a moderate advantage even though the courts tell us that suits
for libel and slander partake more or less of the nature of a
criminal accusation and the preponderance of proof necessary
for plaintiff's case is greater than in ordinary civil actions.75
In defamation actions there are apparently only three
64. 171 La. 286, 131 So. 21 (1930).
65. Id. at 289, 131 So. 21, 22 (1930). Accord, Vicknair v. Daily States Pub.
Co., 153 La. 677, 96 So. 529 (1923); Flanagan v. Nicholson Pub. Co., 137 La.
588, 68 So. 964 (1915).
66. Cf. Martin v. Markley, 202 La. 291, 11 So.2d 593 (1942).
67. Smith v. Lyons, 142 La. 975, 997, 77 So. 896, 904 (1918).
68. See text at notes 22-26 supra for a discussion of the distinction as
well as text at notes 120-143 4nfra concerning Louisiana cases.
69. That is, they must be false, injurious and have been communicated
to a third person. See Kernan v. Chamberlin, 5 Rob. 116 (La. 1843);
Cauchoix v. Dupuy, 3 La. 206 (1831).
70. 38 La. Ann. 161 (1886).
71. Id. at 163.
72. 47 La. Ann. 246, 16 So. 856 (1895).
73. Id. at 254, 16 So. 856, 860 (1895).
74. See generally Mequet v. Silverman, 52 La. Ann. 1369, 27 So. 885
(1900); Savoie v. Scanlan, 43 La. Ann. 967, 9 So. 916 (1891); Buford Bros. v.
Sontheimer, 2 Orl. App. 296 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1905).
75. Sterkx v. Sterkx, 138 La. 440, 453, 70 So. 428, 432 (1915); D'Echaux v.
D'Echaux, 133 La. 123, 62 So. 597 (1913). Accord, Dickerson v. Dickerson,
197 La. 907, 2 So.2d 643 (1941); Lamartlniere v. Daigrepont, 168 So.2d 370
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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defenses-denial, truth, and justification.78 Denial needs no
elaboration. However, it should be noted that since it is essential
to tort liability that the defamation be communicated to some
third person,77 defendant's denial would have to contradict the
testimony of both the plaintiff and that third person or persons.78
The defense of truth has been considered above.7 9
The defense of justification includes the privileges recognized
in Louisiana jurisprudence.80 Defendant may admit that the
statement is defamatory, but claim a privilege. The recognized
privileges are of two types-absolute and conditional."' The
absolute privilege is limited to judges, legislators, and certain
executives, acting in their respective official capacity and no
liability whatsoever will attach. A conditional privilege will
also be a defense if the defendant's conduct under the privilege
has not been excessive. The conditional privilege extends to:
(1) defamatory remarks in protection of a substantial interest
in one's own social or economic welfare;82 (2) defamatory
remarks when the publisher and the recipient have a common
interest protected or furthered by the communication;83 (3)
defamatory remarks in protection of certain third persons;8 4
(4) those made to protect an interest of the person to whom
the remark is addressed;85 (5) those classified as "fair comment"
or in the "protection of public interest" concerning public affairs,
but only if the words in question are comment or opinion and
not a false assertion of fact;88 (6) those made by a public official
in discharge of a public duty, including a false assertion of
76. Lorentz v. Thiesen, 140 La. 663, 73 So. 717 (1917); Williams v.
McManus, 38 La. Ann. 161, 162 (1884). See also Staub v. Van Benthuysen,
36 La. Ann. 467 (1884).
77. See n. 52 supra.
78. The defendant cannot avoid liability simply by denying the exact
words in plaintiff's pleadings, for it is sufficient to prove the substance of
the words charged. See note 46 supra.
79. See text at notes 56-60 supra.
80. An excellent discussion of the privileges in Louisiana defamation
law may be found in a two part Comment in 6 LA. L. Rmv. 281 and 417
(1945).
81. Comment, 6 LA. L. RaV. 281 (1945).
82. Id. at 282. See generally Levy v. McCan, 44 La. Ann. 528, 10 So.
794 (1892); Lynch v. Febiger, 39 La. Ann. 336, 1 So. 690 (1887).
83. Comment, 6 LA. L. Rav. 281, 283 (1945). See generally Oakes v.
Walther, 179 La. 365, 154 So. 26 (1934); Dickinson v. Hathaway, 122 IL
644, 48 So. 136 (1909).
84. Comment, 6 LA. L. Rav. 281, 284 (1945). See also Buisson v. Huard,
106 La. 768, 31 So. 293 (1901).
85. Comment, 6 LA. L. Rav. 281, 285 (1945). See also McBride v. Ledoux,
111 La. 398, 35 So. 615 (1904).
86. See Comment, 6 LA. L. REv. 417, 417-20 (1945).
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fact;87 and (7) defamatory remarks made during a legislative
or judicial proceeding and reported by news media.8 8
Although not defenses to liability, notwithstanding loose
characterization as such, there are situations which mitigate
an award of damages. Included are such things as defendant's
making the statement in good faith, upon reasonable grounds,
supported by acts of the plaintiff;8 9 the utterances being made
in a state of great excitement and so understood by those who
heard them;90 or the utterances being made during an exchange
of mutual opprobrious epithets. 1 Also, retractions or apologies
may be considered in awarding damages.92
DEFAMATION DAMAGES IN LOUISIANA
Injury to reputation93 is at best a nebulous concept; cir-
cumstances virtually control and great discretion must be exer-
cised by the courts in each situation.94 Louisiana apparently
breaks with the common law at this point. Injury to the repu-
tation95 is compensable in Louisiana upon establishment of the
injury, without the necessity of proof of damage in pecuniary
87. Id.
88. Comment, 6 LA. L. Rv. 417, 421 (1945). See also Viosca v. Landfried,
140 La. 609, 73 So. 698 (1917); Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375 (1869).
89. Clement Bros. v. Their Creditors, 37 La. Ann. 692, 694 (1885).
90. See generally Gladney v. De Bretton, 218 La. 296, 49 So.2d 18 (1950);
Germann v. Crescioni, 105 La. 496, 29 So. 968 (1901); Simpson v. Robinson,
104 La. 180, 28 So. 908 (1900); Simons v. Lewis, 51 La. Ann. 327, 25 So. 406
(1898).
91. See Bloom v. Crescioni, 109 La. 667, 33 So. 724 (1903); Goldberg v.
Dobberton, 46 La. Ann. 1303, 16 So. 192 (1894); Johnston v. Barrett, 36 La.
Ann. 320 (1884); Kenner v. Milner, 196 So. 535 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
The fact that defendant made his remarks in a state of drunkenness
may be a matter of mitigation also. Williams v. McManus, 38 La. Ann.
161, 163 (1886).
92. See generally Williams v. McManus, 38 La. Ann. 161 (1886); Cass v.
New Orleans Times, 27 La. Ann. 214 (1875); Perret v. New Orleans Times
Newspaper, 25 La. Ann. 170 (1873). Similarly for good intent of the
publisher, Lavert v. Daily States Pub. Co., 123 La. 594, 609, 49 So. 206, 211
(1909).
93. Defamatory words are "words which produce any perceptible Injury
to the reputation of another." Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La. Ann. 908, 914, 19
So. 925, 927 (1896). When read in connection with the cases finding no
distinction between written and oral words, the definition would evidently
be the same for both.
94. See Cox v. Cashlo, 96 So.2d 872, 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). See
also Gladney v. De Bretton, 218 La. 296, 49 So.2d 18 (1951); Edwards v.
Derrick, 193 La. 331, 190 So. 571 (1939); Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co.,
189 La. 183, 179 So. 75 (1938); Jozsa v. Moroney, 125 La. 813, 51 So. 908
(1910).
95. Louisiana courts classify it as a property interest. See Kennedy v.
Item Co., 213 La. 347, 372, 34 So.2d 886, 895 (1948); Simpson v. Robinson,
104 La. 180, 28 So. 908 (1900).
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form. Louisiana recognizes that injury to reputation can result
simply from the character of the defamatory words and the
circumstances of their use, though proof of pecuniary damage is
impossible.9 6 This is the underlying premise that motivated the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Miller v. Holstein97 to shun the
common law limitations and submit all defamatory words to the
same treatment. "Injury to reputation" was thought sufficiently
elusive to deserve equal treatment in all corners. A break with
the common law over the "actionable per se" category and the
special damage rule left all defamation in Louisiana judged by
the four elements of publication, resulting injury, falsity, and
malice. Once classified as defamation, the only remaining ques-
tion is the amount of damages to be awarded. Predication of
liability on injury without requiring proof of monetary damage
creates no problem as article 1934(3) of the Civil Code9s allows
awards without strict adherence to the concept of demonstrable
pecuniary form. Only after liability is established does a pecu-
niary scale enter the picture, and then merely as an expression
of value of the award, not as an element of proof of liability.
This is clearly a separation of the concept of damage leading
to liability and damages as a dollar amount at which that
liability is taxed. It is a separation of the concept of damage,
that is, injury, and damages, the amount of the monetary award
to the plaintiff. Since Louisiana predicates liability upon and
awards damages for injury or damage, it is essential for con-
ceptual clarity that a clear distinction be maintained between
damage and damages.99 Conceptual clarity, however, has not
96. Carlin v. Stewart, 2 La. 73, 76 (1830). See also Jozsa v. Moroney,
125 La. 813, 51 So. 908 (1910); King v. Ballard, 10 La. Ann. 557 (1855);
Miller v. Roy, 10 La. Ann. 231 (1855); Daly v. Van Benthuysen, 3 La. Ann.
69 (1848); Kernan v. Chamberlin, 5 Rob. 117 (La. 1843).
Many well-written opinions by other United States courts today voice
discontent over the restrictive nature of the requirement for proving
special damages. See Afto-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649,
660 (D.C. Cir. 1966): "[A] special damage requirement would thwart the
function of the law in providing compensation for damage that does not
take a demonstrable pecuniary form."
97. 16 La. 389 (1840).
98. LA. CiVIL CODs art. 1934(3) (1870): "Although the general rule is,
that damages are the amount of the loss ... sustained, or of the gain ...
deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may be assessed without
calculating altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary
gain to the party...."
99. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1957): "Damage. Loss, Injury or
deterioration, caused by . . . one person to another. . . .The word is to
be distinguished from its plural-'damages'-which means a compensation
in money for a loss or damage." "Damages. A pecuniary compensation or
Indemnity which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has
suffered loss, detriment, or injury .. "
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survived the daily language interchange by the courts and
attorneys.10o
In Louisiana, the only proof of injury required is the estab-
lishment of the words as defamatory to the plaintiff. From
this the trier of fact will be allowed to formulate an award.
This award may certainly be based upon proof of distinct and
readily provable dollar losses, such as the loss of a $5000 com-
mission because a customer refused to renew his contract with
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's remarks. It may be
based upon less specific items which nonetheless may be ascer-
tained in money. For example, while a defamed motel manager
may not be able to show a loss of specific customers who would
have rented rooms at his now empty motel, he can show a
general loss of business. A value may be ascertained by looking
to previous business conditions there with allowance for an
average rate of increase and business conditions in similar
motels in the area at the time. Finally the award may be based
upon general circumstances which may not be ascertained in
money but of which, with a view to all aspects of the situation,
it will be said that some dollar figure seems reasonable. If,
due to circulated statements, plaintiff's fiancee refused to marry
him or his wife leaves him, there could certainly be no precise
value established for marriage with a given fiancee or wife,
yet a dollar award should be made to ameliorate all that plain-
tiff has endured. The setting of the amount of damages should
be dealt with only in determining the amount of reparation,
not the need for reparation. Louisiana's approach is able to
do this while the common law requirements create a burden-
some overlapping of the damages concept since specific monetary
damage is used both in the question of establishing liability
and in determining a just award.
Perhaps the results could be better explained by illustra-
tion. If A makes certain statements concerning B's moral char-
acter which cause B immense humiliation, promote scandalous
talk, and lower B's standing in the community, certainly B has
been injured. Assuming that the precise statements by A were
not in the specially treated actionable per se category, a common
100. See Smith v. Lyons, 142 La. 975, 77 So. 896 (1918), and Derivas v.
Gaspard, 1 La. App. 420 (2d Cir. 1925), for good illustrations of the two
ideas used correctly and separately. But see Acme Stores v. Better Business
Bureaus of Baton Rouge, 225 La. 824, 74 So.2d 43 (1954), for an illustration
of Interchange of the two terms.
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law jurisdiction would predicate relief on the showing of special
monetary damages. If B were to plead no more than his humilia-
tion, the community gossip, and his lessening of esteem in the
eyes of the community, he could not support his action because
there was no showing of special damages. 0 1 However, had B
shown that his credit rating had been injured and credit subse-
quently denied,'10 2 or even that specific persons had denied him
gratuitous entertainment,0 8 then B would have met the require-
ment of showing special damages and liability would attach.
Were the same facts to arise in Louisiana, B should not be
denied a remedy, because there is demonstrable injury proved.
The question of monetary damage has not yet arisen-only after
proof of liability for causing injury will a court attempt to
decide upon an equitable award, and the absence of a showing
of special damages will not prevent granting recovery. Instead,
the size of the award will depend on an evaluation of the cir-
cumstances.
If there is no injury, there can be no recovery because
there is no liability.'0 4 But even if the words are injurious with
liability attaching, there may yet be only a small recovery'"
or none at all if the circumstances so dictate. While the likeli-
hood of this happening may be greater when the only claim is
damage to reputation through humiliation, etc., it is not reserved
to such situations. Quite possible are cases of specifically prov-
able pecuniary losses when no award may be forthcoming, or
apparently insignificant awards made because of other consi-
derations in the estimation process.'0 6 Once the aspect of quan-
tum is taken under consideration, however, any special damage
that has been sustainedl'0 will certainly be an element in
determining the amount of the award.
101. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
See also Mell v. Edge, 68 Ga. App. 314, 22 S.E.2d 738 (1942).
102. Muetz v. Tuteur, 20 AM. ST. REP. 115 (1890).
103. Mitchell v. Clement, 1 W.W.R. 183 (1919).
104. An excellent example may be found in Derivas v. Gaspard, 1 La.
App. 420 (2d Cir. 1925).
105. In Buggs v. Harrison, 152 La. 724, 94 So. 369 (1922), there was
liability for a clearly libelous letter to plaintiff's employer, but there was
only an award of $1 because the letter did not affect plaintiff's standing
with his employer and was easily explainable.
106. Tate v. Nicholson Pub. Co., 122 La. 472, 47 So. 774 (1908), holds
that to determine the question of defamation, the court is under a duty to
take into consideration all the circumstances, weigh each fact of legal
significance and consider the occasion on which it was made.
107. Louisiana allows the expense of maintaining a suit for defamation
as an element of special damage. Guice v. Harvey, 14 La. 198 (1839).
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As indicated by the preceding discussion, the lack of a
"proof of pecuniary damage" requirement in Louisiana makes
the measure of damages to be awarded an object of special
interest in those cases where no monetary damage is established.
Because of article 1934(3) actual monetary loss does not have
to be the sole measure of recovery,'08 but even more noteworthy,
"the jury have no fixed rule in assessing the sum for which
they are to give a verdict,"'' 09 but must find a guide in their
own consciences for the damages.110 Such leeway afforded the
trier of fact is essential in carrying out the provisions of article
1934(3), especially when the injury inflicted by defamation
is not readily capable of monetary approximation.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that there
are some harms that must unavoidably be inferred from the
nature of the defamation such as estimated damage to reputa-
tion, credit or some injured feelings,"' the courts' discretion
must yet take into consideration "the severity of the charges,
the motives of the defamer, the 'position of influence' enjoyed
by the defamer and the consequent extent and weight of the
circulation of the defamation."" 2 The damages should then be
commensurate with the character of the language used, 1 8 but
a judgment may also take into consideration the ability of the
defendant to pay." 4
Subjective as they may be, the respect, integrity, and
reputation of the plaintiff, developed through the pleadings and
the evidence, and accepted as commensurate with his station
in life, are evaluated by the trier of fact with a view to balanc-
108. See generally Jozsa v. Moroney, 125 La. 813, 51 So. 908 (1910);
King v. Ballard, 10 La. Ann. 557 (1855); Daly v. Van Benthuysen, 3 La.
Ann. 69 (1848).
109. Guice v. Harvey, 14 La. 198, 202 (1839). This statement and those
in the cases cited in note 110 infra make it difficult to understand how
the author of Note, 32 Tui. L. REv. 135 (1957), can adhere to the position
that, "the injured party is entitled only to such damages as he can prove."
Id. at 136.
110. Carlin v. Stewart, 2 La. 73, 76 (1830). See generally Gladney v.
De Bretton, 218 La. 296, 49 So.2d 18 (1951); Germann v. Crescioni, 105 La.
496, 29 So. 968 (1901); East v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 168 So.2d 426
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); American Steel Bldg. Co. v. Brezner, 158 So.2d
623 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: From What
Source Does it Derive?, 16 TUL. L. RmV. 489 (1942).
111. See Levert v. Daily States Pub. Co., 123 La. 594, 49 So. 206 (1909).
112. Cox v. Cashio, 96 So.2d 872, 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). Accord,
Madison v. Bolton, 234 La. 997, 102 So.2d 433 (1958); Kennedy v. Item Co.,
213 La. 347, 34 So.2d 886 (1948).
113. Bonnin v. Elliott, 19 La. Ann. 322 (1867).
114. Lorentz v. Thiesen, 140 La. 663, 668-69, 73 So. 717, 719 (1917).
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ing the effect both present and future on the wronged party's
life caused by the defamation. Though the courts find favor
in such language as, "in view of all the circumstances, we find
$XX to be a fair award," or "from our review of the record,
we find no abuse of the trial judge's discretion in awarding
$YY damages and affirm this as a just award," some additional
insight into the reasoning of the court may be found.115 The
tendency of the evidence to show that a person was highly
respected in the community or that his general reputation was
impeccable, or that he possessed unusual ability in his calling,
or was a man of unquestioned integrity might lead one to suggest
that the court's human and judicial experience as a "reasonable
man" is the fire in which an award of damages is forged.
Undoubtedly the fact that the person is a professional
man 11 or a business personality1 7 carries great weight. Similarly
the relative unreasonableness of the defamer must be noted-
the concept of punishing the "bad man" cannot be overlooked."18
Even though communication to one other person is enough, the
size of the audience and their individual or collective relation-
ship to the person defamed must carry some weight. 1 9
Many reasonable criteria could be included in the catalog
115. This writer makes no attempt to exhaust the many close factual
situations that have influenced the courts' discretion in making defamation
awards. It is hoped that no great injustice will be done this area simply
by relying on the courts' sweeping statements as to discretion and announce-
ments of general principles that have a bearing on the body of the law.
One of the most interesting cases that turns on a narrow factual point
concerns a physician who was a member of a medical society which con-
demned advertising for physicians and who himself was opposed to adver-
tising in any form. A newspaper published an article praising the physician's
great skill after he had cured a young woman afflicted with a very serious
disease. In a suit for libel, based on the policy of his medical society and
his own personal convictions, though the statement was complimentary
to plaintiff and though the words themselves were not actionable, the
physician alleged that because of the feeling against advertising among
regular physicians and the fact that doctors who resort to it are looked
upon by the regular practitioners and the public with contempt, he was
thereby lowered in the esteem of his friends and his business was injured.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the physician's petition stated a
good cause of action. Martin v. The Picayune, 115 La. 979, 40 So. 376 (1906).
116. Tarleton v. Lagarde, 46 La. Ann. 1368, 16 So. 180 (1894) (physician);
Gladney v. De Bretton, 218 La. 196, 49 So.2d 18 (1951) (attorney); Madison v.
Bolton, 234 La. 997, 102 So.2d 433 (1958) (same).
117. Central Improvement & Contracting Co. v. Grasser Contracting
Co., 119 La. 263, 44 So. 10 (1907) (contractor); Sciortino v. Batt, 164 So.2d
136 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), writ refused, 246 La. 720, 167 So.2d 302 (1964)
(real estate agent).
118. See Naihaus v. Louisiana Weekly Pub. Co., 176 La. 240, 145 So. 527
(1933); Simms v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (La App. 1st Cir. 1940).
119. See cases cited in note 52 supra.
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and yet no absolute rules could be deduced. It can be said with
reasonable certainty, however, that if the overall effect of the
event-viewed as to parties, place and reasonableness-'is such
that would cause a reasonable, prudent man to believe that such
effect tends to injure plaintiff's reputation, plaintiff will recover
damages sufficient to soothe his suffering and impress upon the
defendant that he stepped beyond the bounds of reason and
decency. Though the key element of the tort is resultant injury,
with a view to the discretion, reasonable experience and the
absence of requiring proof of actual damages, it seems the
real test is the tendency of the total event to injure the existing
reputation of the plaintiff. This is borne out from a procedural
standpoint in that plaintiff need not produce witnesses that
will testify as to their degree of esteem for plaintiff prior to
the remarks at issue and their consequent lessened esteem for
him afterwards. Although as pointed out earlier, an introduc-
tion of evidence by defendant that no one took the remarks
seriously or gave them any second thought will indeed act in
mitigation of damages.
LOUISIANA'S BORROWED CONFUSION:
THE "PER SE" SUFFIX
The difficulties encountered by the common law in the use
of the per se suffix in two separate connotations 20 have not been
without a Louisiana counterpart. An examination of the Lou-
isiana cases will show a similar and equally respectable con-
fusion. In Louisiana the terminology "slanderous per se" was
originally used to designate words which carried their defama-
tory meaning on their face-the same as the term "slanderous
per se" was correctly employed at common law.121 In such cases,
actual malice did not have to be shown. This, however, was not
in any way an adoption of the technical common law classifica-
tions. The cases as early as 1891122 correctly employed this
120. See text at notes 22-26 supra. See also MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 113(1935); Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HAev. L. REV.
733 (1966); Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1629 (1966);
Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960); Carpenter, Libel Per Se
in California and Some Other States, 17 So. CALIF. L. REV. 347 (1944).
121. See text at notes 22-31 supra.
122. Savoie v. Scanlan, 43 La. Ann. 967, 9 So. 916 (1891). Much earlier
In Kernan v. Chamberlin, 5 Rob. 116, 117 (La. 1843), the court simply used
the term "actionable words" to mean words determined to be slanderous-
meaning that if slanderous, they were actionable. It went no further and
should not therefore be confused and construed to mean "actionable per se."
Accord, Cauchoix v. Dupuy, 3 La. 206 (1831).
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terminology by holding that malice might be inferred from the
nature of the charge made; where words were clearly defama-
tory, malice would be presumed, whereas if they merely created
extrinsic defamatory effects, the malice must not be presumed.12
This was later shortened to the holding that the law presumes
malice where slanderous words are used.124 But slanderous as
used in this latter sense evidently meant slanderous on their
face because the same cases were cited to support the state-
ment as had supported the term slanderous per se when it was
explained to mean "on its face. ' 125
In most instances the Louisiana courts have adhered to this
principle, but at times have interchanged the terms "slanderous
per se" and "actionable per se," the latter meaning those words
which the common law has traditionally said require no proof
of damage, giving the misleading impression that Louisiana
embraces the common law distinction between cases in which
damage is presumed and those where special damage must
be shown.u 6
Another example of confusing terminology is found in
Tuyes v. Chambers,127 in which the court found that plaintiff's
demand fell into the class of cases requiring proof of special
damage and that the language complained of would, "when
made orally, give rise to special damages, which must be alleged
and proven," but which if written, "become actionable per se."'128
In support of this the court cites six common law decisions,
but none of the Louisiana jurisprudence which refuses to make
the written-oral distinction.129
123. Wimbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. Ann. 246, 254, 16 So. 856, 859 (1895);
Jozsa v. Moroney, 125 La. 813, 821, 51 So. 908, 911 (1910). See also McClure
v. McMartin, 104 La. 496, 29 So. 227 (1901); Buford Bros. v. Sontheimer,
2 Orl. App. 296 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1905).
124. Smith v. Lyons, 142 La. 975, 997, 77 So. 896, 904 (1918); Covington v.
Roberson, 111 La. 326, 35 So. 586 (1903).
125. See Savoie v. Scanlan, 43 La. Ann. 967, 9 So. 916 (1891); Kernan v.
Chamberlin, 5 Rob. 116 (La. 1843).
126. Madison v. Bolton, 234 La. 997, 102 So.2d 433 (1958), affords an
example of erroneous interchange of the elusive "per se" terms. The court
stated, "Words not actionable per sb are actionable only In consequence
of extrinsic facts." Id. at 1011, rather than correctly stating "Words not
slanderous per se. .. "
127. 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919).
128. Id. at 729, 81 So. 265, 267 (1919).
129. In Santana v. Item Co., 192 La. 819, 831, 189 So. 442, 446 (1939),
the court found the publication "did not Inflict that species of Injury which
results 'from the very nature of the words or writing,' from which 'the
law presumes injury.' Plaintiff is therefore entitled to only such special
damages as he alleged and proved."
But In Johnson v. Crow, 158 So. 857 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935), when the
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In Fitzpatrick v. Zedaird Realty Co.,18 where calling a
person a "dirty old man, a liar, and a thief" was deemed slander
per se, it is hard to say in what way the court was using the
term. The question was whether the words were slander; and
the court answered it by saying they were slanderous per se.
Apparently the court meant that the words themselves were
patently slanderous. The question in no way dealt with classi-
fication of words already deemed slanderous as either "action-
able per se" or, though "slanderous in tendency,"'8 requiring
proof of special damage. Since it was an initial determination
of whether words were slander or not, and not an attempt to
characterize them as to type of slander, it is submitted that
the court used slanderous per se to denote that they carried
their meaning on their face.'8
A case demonstrating the confusion of the slanderous per se
and actionable per se doctrines is Martin v. Markley,lu where
the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly stated:
"To ascertain whether the writing in the instant case is
libelous per se,184 examination must be made of the charges
uttered by the defendant with a view to whether they
may be regarded as defamatory without the aid of extrinsic
proof-that is to say, whether the statements made are
susceptible of but one meaning. '1m
The confusion is shown when the court also stated:
court talks about libelous per ae it states, id. at 859, "it is not necessary
to prove special or pecuniary damage," and does not restrict this to any
special words, but states this as true of all defamation. The particular
situation involved was a charge of theft, which was included at common
law in its special classes of slander. This fact might suggest that the state-
ment concerning an absence of necessity of proving special damages applied
only to charges of theft; but upon careful reading, neither the opinion nor
the civil law theory it deals with puts such a limitation on the theory.
130. 10 La. App. 306, 121 So. 680 (Orl. Cir. 1929).
131. Tarlton v. Lagarde, 46 La. Ann. 1368, 1373, 16 So. 180, 181 (1894).
132. In James v. FDIC, 231 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. La. 1964), the court
said, Wc. at 479: "The necessary premise that the statements are defamatory
per se Is missing here." When this is read in context, the court was talking
about whether the words themselves were defamatory at all, so as to attach
the presumption of falsity and malice, but concluded that the statement
could not be so classified because the "necessary premise" that the words
are in fact defamatory was missing. However, the terminology employed
was not the clearest possible.
133. 202 La. 291, 11 So.2d 593 (1942).
134. Since all libel in Louisiana is actionable without showing any-
thing more than its publication, this must not mean libel "actionable
per se." See Upton v. Times-Democrat Publishing Co., 104 La. 141, 28 So.
970 (1900).
135. 202 La. 291, 299, 11 So.2d 593, 596 (1942).
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"If it is libelous per se, the law presumes it was false and
malicious... On the other hand, if the writing is actionable
per quod. . . ."186
Thus the court incorrectly compares the idea of being defama-
tory without aid of extrinsic proof with the characterization of
actionability. These are clearly non-comparable. Perhaps the
court was simply careless with its language, although in support
of its statement on actionability it cites a common law
authority.18
An example at the appellate level is Giordano v. Tullier.' 8
The opinion states: "Proof of actual malice is not necessary if
the words are actionable per se."189 To support this the Fourth
Circuit cites Cadro v. Plaquemines Gazette'4 and Cotonio v.
Guglielmo.141 In Cadro there is absolutely no mention of words
being actionable per se. The second case cited is only authority
for the fact that actual malice is not necessary to sustain an
action for libel because the actionable per se / actionable per
quod distinction does not apply to libel.142 This was true at
common law, but such fact adds nothing to Louisiana's position
since our courts have already refused to distinguish between
oral and written defamation. 148
This use of the same words to mean different things and
different words to mean the same thing demands that the
researcher in the area of the Louisiana law of defamation keep
in mind the proper separation of the two uses of the per se
suffix to avoid being misled into thinking that the common law
technicalities are finding an inroad into our law.14 4 Confusing
phrases in briefs and opinions only hinder the ready under-
standing of our law; they do not change the law itself.
136. Id.
137. Cited was 33 Am. JUR. Libel and Slander §§ 242, 266 and 274. See
also Wiel v. Israel, 42 La. Ann. 955, 8 So. 826 (1890), citing ODGERS, SLANDER
AND LmF. (1st Am. ed. 1881), an English common law hornbook.
138. 139 So.2d 15 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
139. Id. at 20. But see text at note 121 supra.
140. 202 La. 1, 11 So.2d 10 (1942).
141. 176 La. 421, 146 So. 11 (1933).
142. See notes 12-15 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 38, 93 supra and accompanying text.
144. Undoubtedly the common law has influenced Louisiana in that
our courts have no trouble finding injury and adopting the strong common
law presumption In charges of crime, loathsome disease, and unchastity.
The difference Is that Louisiana's presumption of injury extends to other





Relative to defamation concerning radio and television,
Louisiana has statutorily discarded one of the major concepts
which distinguishes our defamation law from the traditional
common law position.145 In this area there has been a new
requirement placed on libel.14 Statutory surgery on the com-
mon law concept of libel as applied to radio and television has
long been the goal of the National Association of Broadcasters.
Since television programs, and, in some instances, radio pro-
grams, because of the use of a script, are treated as libel,147
they have been generally governed by the law of libel. The
Association is seeking to change the law governing radio and
television defamation from the common law position that no
proof of actual damage is required in libel causes of action.1
Their reason for this is to make recovery against members of
their interest group more difficult and limited to actual damage
proven. Their chief argument is that such provision facilitates
the work of the courts by eliminating the need to distinguish
between libel and slander on radio and television, a problem
which has given the courts and legal scholars a great deal of
trouble.149 With their proposed uniform statute, radio or tele-
vision defamation would become in reality a new tort. Whether
it took the form of libel or slander, it would receive the same
treatment and, even though most often called libel, would not
partake of the normal libel rules on the damage issue.
Louisiana is one of sixteen'50 states which have enacted the
model statute or a similar statute embodying its provisions.1 51
145. See LA. R.S. 45:1351-1354 (1950).
146. Radio and television defamation is most commonly classified as
libel, although there is much controversy over this question.
147. See Harum, Remolding of Common Law Defamation, 49 A.B.A.J.
149 (1963), for an excellent article on the present state of the law of
defamation in its relationship to radio and television, and the National
Association of Broadcasters' move for statutes and changes in the law.
148. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
149. See Donnelly, Defamation by Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IowA
L. Rv. 12 (1948); Yankwich, Trends in the Law Affecting Media of Com-
munication, 15 F.R.D. 291 (1954); Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends in
Defamation by Radio, 64 HARv. L. REv. 727 (1951); Note, 51 L.Q. Rov. 573
(1935); Note, 33 VA. L. REv. 612 (1947); Note, 43 CORN. L.Q. 320 (1957); Note,
33 Miss. L.J. 115 (1961).
150. Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming.
151. LA. R.S. 45:1353 (1950): "In any action against any owner, licensee
or operator, or the agents or employees of any owner, licensee or operator,
of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations for
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The anomaly of this reasoning of the Association when applied
to the existing jurisprudence of Louisiana is that the statute
will not facilitate the Louisiana courts' task of distinguishing
between libel and slander over the video or audio waves
because such a distinction is not made in Louisiana. Since in
Louisiana defamation is actionable without proof of special
damages, there is no need for a distinction in the treatment
of libel and slander.152 All defamation carries the same liability
provisions. However, the new statute carves out a segment
of the law of defamation and imposes the notion of actual
damages on it.
While the Association achieved its lobby purpose, it seems
that Louisiana's defamation law was not aided by adoption of
the statute. In fact it can result in two different standards being
applied to the same occurrence. Suppose A, not an employee of
the station or network, defames B over the air. In an action
by B against A for defamation, proof of actual damages would
not be necessary as this would be an action based on articles
2315 and 1934(3) of the Civil Code. But if B were to sue the
management of the radio station under the radio-television
defamation provisions in the Revised Statutes, he would have
to prove actual damages and would be able to recover only such
damages as he did prove. This would affect the concept of joint
tortfeasors and suggests additional problems for a wronged
plaintiff in bringing his action.
Any problems envisioned concerning the actual operation
of the statute in such a case, however, are purely speculative,
as there is no record of any litigation invoking this statutory
provision since its adoption in 1950.158
THE FUTURE: THE "NEW YoRK TIMES RULE"
The Supreme Court of the United States has virtually
rewritten liability requirements pertaining to words affecting
a person in public office-that is the new "public official"
damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a
part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, the complaining party shall be
allowed only such actual damages as he may prove." (Emphasis added.)
152. See note 93 supra.
153. La. Acts 1950, No. 468, § 3.
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doctrine as announced in New York Times v. Sullivan8 4 and
Garrison v. Louisiana.55
There may no longer be recovery of damages by a public
official "for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official con-
duct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'
The application of the principle seems to be an expanding
and not a restricting one, applying to appointed as well as
elected officials,1 57 and to candidates for office as well as incum-
bents.158 Garrison further made it clear'that the rule of New
York Times "is not rendered inapplicable merely because an
official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation,
is harmed." 59 Further, in Pauling v. News Syndicate, Inc.,16 the
plaintiff, a private citizen, sued defendant for alleged libelous
statements contained in a newspaper published by it. On appeal,
the court, in affirming a jury verdict for the defendant, dis-
cussed (in dictum) the effect of the Times case:
"Although the public official is the strongest case for the
constitutional compulsion of such a privilege, it is ques-
tionable whether in the principle the [N.Y. Times] decision
can be so limited."'161
The court suggested an extension to "the participant in public
debate on an issue of grave public concern.18 2 This is the same
extension doctrine that appears in Walker v. Courier-Journal &
Louisville Times Co.8 3 Though the trend of extension seems
154. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
155. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
156. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In the Garrison case the Court stated
that the rule of the Times case "is not rendered inapplicable merely because
an official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed."
Id. at 77 (1964).
157. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Thompson v. St. Amant,
184 So.2d 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
158. Dyer v. Davis, 189 So.2d 678 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); State v. Browne,
86 N.J. Super. 217, 206 A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1965); Block v. Benton, 44 Misc.2d
1053, 255 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Supp. 1964).
159. 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). This is being interpreted by the courts to
apply only if the injury to private reputation is incidental to an attack
on the public reputation. It is not applied if the public reputation is
by-passed and an attack is made on the personal character of the individual
involved. Walker v. Associated Press, 191 So.2d 727, 733 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1966).
160. 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964).
161. Id. at 671.
162. 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964).
163. 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965). See also Afro-American Pub-
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well established, some courts have shown alarm at the idea
of the uninhibited debate on public issues guaranteed by the
first amendment being "turned into an open season to shoot
down the good name of any man who happens to be a public
servant,"' 164 even though "public men are, as it were, public
property."'1 5
Then the Supreme Court announced:
"We are treating here only the element of public position,
since that is all that has been argued and briefed. We
intimate no view whatever whether there are other bases
for applying the New York Times standards-for example,
that in a particular case the interests in reputation are
relatively insubstantial, because the subject of discussion
has thrust himself into the vortex of the discussion of a
question of pressing public concern."''1 6
In its latest pronouncement the Supreme Court clearly stated
that which could be inferred from the quotation above and
which has been held by many lower courts.
"We consider and would hold that a 'public figure' who is
not a public official may also recover damages for a defama-
tory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger
to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreason-
able conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers."'167
Louisiana courts have recently done battle with the public
official or public figure doctrine in Thompson v. St. Amant0 5
and Walker v. Associated Press.1 9 In Thompson the Louisiana
Supreme Court finally found actual malice under the "New
lishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1966), quoting substantially
from Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 197 (8th Cir.
1966): "There are, of course, fact situations where the courts understand-
ably have refused to apply the principle. These include cases where the
subject, although perhaps a public figure, did not conduct himself or speak
out on a matter of public import [citations], or where the subject was a
person prominent only in another country [citations]."
164. Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Ky. App. 1965).
165. Beauharnals v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 263 n. 18 (1952).
166. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n. 12 (1966).
167. Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts; Associated Press v. Walker,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
168. 250 La. 405, 196 So.2d 255 (1967).




York Times Rule," overruled the court of appeal's decision 7'
and held for the plaintiff. However, the trial court, court of
appeal, and Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiff, a deputy
sheriff, was a public official. But the Louisiana Supreme Court
pointed out that simply because a person is technically a
"public official" under state law, it does not follow that the
"New York Times Rule" applies.
"The real test is whether the official has, or appears to
the public to have, 'substantial responsibility for or control
over the conduct of governmental affairs."'' 1
This was the same test announced by the United States Supreme
Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer.172
In the Walker case, retired general Edwin A. Walker was
held to be a public figure within the "New York Times Rule"
by both the trial court and the court of appeal, and actual malice
was found, but the court of appeal reduced the damages awarded
him from $2,250,000 to $75,000. After the Louisiana Supreme
Court granted writs on the case,178 the United States Supreme
Court, hearing an appeal from a judgment for Walker in the
Texas courts based on the same occurrence, held that the New
York Times standard for malice had not been met when applied
to the actions of the Associated Press.174 The Associated Press
petitioned the Supreme Court to summarily reverse the deci-
sion in the Louisiana case as being in direct conflict with this
Supreme Court decision and the Supreme Court directed Lou-
isiana courts to proceed in a manner not inconsistent with its
decision in the Texas version of the case.
Apparently, the law of defamation will undergo a significant
change if the indicated extensions are fully exploited.1 5
170. 184 So.2d 314 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), holding that the remarks
were not made with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966
Term-Torts, 27 LA. L. REv. 479 (1967).
171. Thompson v. St. Amant, 250 La. 405, 196 So.2d 255, 261 (1967).
172. 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). See also Bertelsman, Libel and Public Men,
52 A.B.A.J. 657 (1966).
173. 250 La. 102, 194 So.2d 99 (1967).
174. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts; Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967).
175. For an excellent discussion of extensions of the "public official"
category and its application to a "public figure," see Pauling v. Globe-
Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), and exhaustive cita-
tions therein. An excellent collection of cases on this point is also found in
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts; Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S.




Any segment of the law of defamation-the historical acci-
dent of its origin, the policy notions that have molded it, its
infiltration by news media, or speculation as to its future-
makes an interesting field of study to which many pages of
exposition could alone be devoted. For this reason, it is im-
possible to offer in the preceding pages more than a compendium
of this tort.
Although the United States Supreme Court has sown the
seeds of change, beginning with malice and public officials, and
now cultivated them with the general concept of public figure,
the extent of the harvest is yet unclear. In other areas of the
law of defamation, the common law states remain reluctant
to do more than slip away but slightly from the older English
rules, and no uniform proposals of reform can be agreed on.176
Louisiana continues to reject the necessity of proof of special
damages as a condition of liability, believing that flexibility
can be accommodated by so doing, and has rather successfully
demonstrated this to be true over the years.
The debate over radio and television defamation will un-
doubtedly continue, but the National Association of Broad-
casters is proving to be a powerful and effective lobby, even
bringing an avenue for change into Louisiana's general position
in this area. Similarly, other distinct torts are being carved
from the once all-encompassing sphere of defamation-such
torts as invasion of the right of privacy,1 77 and injurious false-
hood,1h are more adequately handling many of the problems
once forced under "defamation."
The future of defamation is indeed uncertain, as has been
its past. But it is an area of immense importance, and will
remain a fertile area of litigation.
John T. Cox, Jr.
176. See PROSSER, TORTS § 107 (3d ed. 1964), for a discussion of the major
reform proposals and the factors impeding them.
177. PROSSER, TORTS § 112 (3d ed. 1964): "The privacy cases go consi-
derably beyond the narrow limits of defamation and no doubt have suc-
ceeded In affording a needed remedy in a good many instances not covered
by the other tort."
See also Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV.
1093 (1962).
178. PROSSER, TORTS § 122 (3d ed. 1964). See also Note, 63 YALE L. J. 65
(1953).
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